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DOES THE SUPREME COURT FOLLOW
THE ECONOMIC RETURNS? A RESPONSE TO
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INTRODUCTION
Finley Peter Dunne’s fictional political sage, Mr. Dooley,
1
famously said that the Supreme Court “follows th’ iliction returns.”
In their contribution to this Symposium, Thomas Brennan, Lee
Epstein, and Nancy Staudt argue instead that Supreme Court
2
decisions track macroeconomic indicators. Drawing on evidence that
voters tend to vote for the government in a strong economy or during
economic crises but vote against the government during more
3
moderate economic slumps, Professors Brennan, Epstein, and Staudt
4
hypothesize that judges do the same. Our interlocutors have tested
this hypothesis by analyzing the national government’s fortunes in tax
cases decided between 1912 and 1929, a period of “ordinary”
economic upswings and downturns, and between 1930 and 1940,
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This Response expands on remarks presented at the Duke Law Journal Conference on
Measuring Judges and Justice, held on February 6, 2009. We are grateful to the conference’s
organizers for inviting us to participate, to Thomas Brennan, Lee Epstein, and Nancy Staudt for
providing food for thought, to Richard Schmalbeck and Larry Zelenak for explaining earlytwentieth-century tax policy to us, and to Jonathan Williams for helpful comments on the
manuscript.
1. FINLEY PETER DUNNE, MR. DOOLEY’S OPINIONS 26 (1901).
2. Thomas Brennan, Lee Epstein & Nancy Staudt, Economic Trends and Judicial
Outcomes: A Macrotheory of the Court, 58 DUKE L.J. 1191, 1194 (2009).
3. Id. at 1191–92.
4. Id. at 1194.
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during the Great Depression. These data appear to support their
hypothesis: In the initial period, the government tended to win more
of its tax cases during upswings and lose more during downturns.
During the Depression, the government won considerably more tax
5
cases than it lost.
Like much of the empirical literature this conference addresses,
Professors Brennan, Epstein, and Staudt have demonstrated a
correlation between factors that most would consider extralegal and
the outcomes of judicial decisions. Unlike the greater part of that
literature, Brennan, Epstein, and Staudt do not call those factors
“political”—rather, they distinguish their “macrotheory” of the
Supreme Court from both the conventional legal model and the
6
attitudinal model of judicial behavior, which posits that judges vote
7
to vindicate their political and policy preferences. Nonetheless, this
economic “macrotheory” raises the same basic question that
underlies this conference, not to mention the empirical project as a
whole: What can empirical demonstrations of this sort teach about
judges and the law?
The question is significant on a number of levels. Empirical
analysis of judicial behavior is a growth industry in the legal academy,
but it also seems fair to say that the field remains in its infancy. As
8
our colleague Jack Knight’s contribution to this conference suggests,
it is a good time to be asking basic questions about what sort of
hypotheses empiricists ought to be testing and how these research
projects ought to relate—if at all—to traditional legal scholarship.
More broadly, this sort of research has the potential to deepen our
understanding of how the law works and, possibly, to increase the
9
predictability of judicial outcomes—a basic aspect of the rule of law.
But a downside risk exists as well: empiricists frequently posit that
judges decide cases based on motivations, such as raw political
preference or economic self-interest, that most participants in the
5. Id. at 1196.
6. Id. at 1204–07.
7. See generally JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002) (developing the attitudinal model of judicial
behavior).
8. Jack Knight, Are Empiricists Asking the Right Questions About Judicial
Decisionmaking?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1531 (2009).
9. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse,
97 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8 (1997) (describing the core elements of the “Rule of Law” as including
“the capacity of legal rules, standards, or principles to guide people in the conduct of their
affairs” so that people can “understand the rule and comply with it”).
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legal community would consider profoundly illegitimate. Although
we think that conventional thinking about law incorporates a far
greater role for politics and economics than empiricists typically
imagine, the project of reducing law entirely to these factors is likely
10
to generate a great deal of hostility. This Symposium, and hopefully
our contribution to it, is an effort to prevent empiricists and lawyers
from talking past one another.
Although they acknowledge that their study is preliminary,
Professors Brennan, Epstein, and Staudt make bold claims about the
implications of their findings. First, they conclude that “the Justices
believe they have a role to play in assuring national economic
11
prosperity and growth.” Second, they “challenge the conventional
belief that the Court maintained a strong and unambiguous bias
against President Roosevelt’s administration prior to the
12
announcement of the Court-packing plan.” Finally, they claim that
their findings “may help explain Supreme Court votes in the post–
World War II era and, at the same time, forecast upcoming votes in
the context of the serious national economic decline that began in
13
2008.”
We are skeptical that their data support these larger assertions.
In this Response, we probe each of these conclusions. We argue in
Part I that no evidence shows that the Justices deliberately try to
affect the economy and that whether the Justices act consciously or
unconsciously is an important point that Professors Brennan, Epstein,
and Staudt fail to address. Part II offers a more nuanced view of the
Court’s activity during the Roosevelt administration. Although
Brennan, Epstein, and Staudt have shown that the Court favored the
government in tax cases, we argue that conventional legal analysis can
offer different—and perhaps more accurate—explanations for their
findings. In Part III, we argue that empirical data alone cannot
necessarily predict or explain Supreme Court behavior; without
probing why the Justices favor the government—an issue legal
analysis can illuminate—empiricists can only guess why the Court did

10. See, e.g., Michael Boudin, Response, A Response to Professor Ramseyer, Predicting
Court Outcomes Through Political Preferences, 58 DUKE L.J. 1687, 1688 (2009) (“[T]o call
judges’ subsequent choices in public policy cases ‘political’ is mere provocation.”).
11. Brennan, Epstein & Staudt, supra note 2, at 1196.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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what it did in particular prior decisions or predict what will happen in
individual future cases.
Finally, we suggest in Part IV how our interlocutors might refine
their study to better assist legal scholars, lawyers, and judges. Our
goal is to provide constructive avenues for further research.
Professors Brennan, Epstein, and Staudt have shown an interesting
correlation between economic conditions and Supreme Court
decisions (at least in the tax area). Some explanation—economic,
political, or legal—must exist for their findings. We have attempted to
suggest some refinements to the research design that may illuminate
the relationship between judicial decisions and the economy and
enhance the predictive value of their model.
I. THE COURT’S ROLE IN SHAPING ECONOMIC POLICY
At the outset, it is important to note the strength of Professors
Brennan, Epstein, and Staudt’s claim. They argue that “rational
Justices will look to the economy as a signal of policymaking
competence in the elected branches of government and will use their
decisionmaking power to support (or impede)” legislative or executive
14
policies. According to Brennan, Epstein, and Staudt, Justices
15
“believe they have a role” in shaping economic prosperity. This
means that
judicial refusal to implement perceived policy failures could work to
limit possible damage to the economy, thereby advancing the
interests of the Justices. Similarly, in times of crisis, we simply argue
that the Court’s progovernment bias will assist Congress and the
president in the recovery effort, again promoting the Justices’
16
interests in economic growth and stability.

Brennan, Epstein, and Staudt seem to argue that Justices deliberately
vote to punish, reward, or assist the government depending on the
state of the economy. They have concluded, not that judicial decisions
simply correlate with economic trends, but that a causal link exists
because the Justices purposely decide cases to shape the economy,
albeit at the margins.
This interpretation implicitly rejects a less drastic—and longaccepted—possible explanation of their data that factors such as
14. Id. at 1203 (emphasis added).
15. Id. at 1196.
16. Id. at 1203.
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external events unconsciously influence judicial decisionmaking. We
have already cited Mr. Dooley’s observation that the Supreme Court
17
follows electoral returns —an observation that may well reflect
unconscious deference to the political zeitgeist rather than deliberate
efforts by the Justices to accommodate political trends. Legal realism
similarly observed that judges’ environment and background can
18
unconsciously sway their decisions. Since the advent of empirical
literature on judicial behavior, many commentators have argued that
unconscious influences affect judges’ decisions. For example,
Professor Dan Kahan has invoked cognitive theory to show that
influences—such as economic conditions—unconsciously shape
19
judicial decisions. Justice Holmes made the same point a bit earlier:
The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political
theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the
prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a
good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by
20
which men should be governed.

Scholars have applied the notion that judges act based on unconscious
21
predispositions to a variety of legal contexts.
We invoke Justice Holmes in part to show that morality, views of
good policy, unconscious prejudices, and political preferences have
17. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
18. For example, Professor Jerome Frank, in his classic discussion of what factors drive
judicial decisionmaking, argues that judges decide based on “a ‘hunch’ as to what is fair and just
or wise or expedient” that emerges from “[t]he effect of innumerable stimuli on what is loosely
termed ‘the personality of the judge.’” Jerome Frank, What Courts Do in Fact, 26 ILL. L. REV.
645, 655 (1932). Frank contends, as an example, that judges hearing testimony develop a hunch
as “a composite reaction of a multitude of responses to the stimuli set up by witnesses—stimuli
which encounter the judge’s (or jury’s) biases, ‘stereotypes,’ preconceptions, and the like.” Id. at
656.
19. See Dan M. Kahan, “Ideology in” vs. “Cultural Cognition of” Law: What Difference
Does It Make? 7 (Yale Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Research
Paper No. 180, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1111865 (“Judges, like everyone
else, . . . gravitate toward the factual beliefs that are most congenial to their defining
commitments.”).
20. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Harv.
Univ. Press 1963) (1881); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 93–121 (2008)
(agreeing that judges’ unconscious world views shape their jurisprudence).
21. E.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L.
REV. 119, 153 (2002) (arguing that appellate judges’ unconscious biases may lead them to
discount harms to plaintiffs); John F. Pfaff, The Continued Vitality of Structured Sentencing
Following Blakely: The Effectiveness of Voluntary Guidelines, 54 UCLA L. REV. 235, 283–84
(2006) (arguing that voluntary sentencing guidelines work because they help judges form
unconscious expectations about reasonable sentences).
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long been part of the legal profession’s own conventional account of
judicial decisionmaking. Professors Brennan, Epstein, and Staudt
contrast their macroeconomic theory with the following “legal
model” of judging:
In the legal model, the Court’s responsibility is to ensure that
government policies comply with the mandates of relevant federal
laws and, absent a legal breach, the Court will uphold the
government activity as entirely legitimate. The legal model, in its
most extreme form, gives no consideration to the individual views of
the Justices or to national political, economic, or cultural trends,
unless they are somehow embedded into the law through the
22
majoritarian process.

It is one thing to posit this impoverished account of judicial
decisionmaking as an archetype and quite another to suggest that
anyone in the profession or the legal academy thinks this is how
judges actually decide cases. Much of the debate about formalism in
public law, for example, has concerned how to formulate legal
principles in such a way as to minimize judicial discretion and thus
23
constrain judges from following their preferences. The common law
tradition, on the other hand, has often celebrated the open texture of
legal rules as allowing independent judges to adapt the law to
24
changing policy imperatives. But no one thinks these influences can
be eliminated entirely. By positing a “legal model” that is alien to
actual legal discourse, our interlocutors—and much of the empirical
literature—undermine their ability to contribute to the debates that
actually are going on.
The strong dichotomy between a “legal” and an “economic”
model of judging also ignores the extent to which conventional legal
analysis may incorporate economic considerations. The state of the
economy may be legally relevant to the decision of cases. An
economic crisis, for example, may create compelling governmental
interests that figure importantly in the resolution of cases. In the
25
Depression-era case Home Building & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell,
“emergency powers” arguments based on the economic crisis

22. Brennan, Epstein & Staudt, supra note 2, at 1206.
23. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175,
1179–87 (1989).
24. See, e.g., BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 178–79
(1921).
25. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
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influenced the Court’s decision to uphold state mortgage legislation
26
against a Contracts Clause challenge. Many legal rules balance
important interests, and an economic crisis may create stronger
regulatory interests than the government would enjoy in ordinary
times. Likewise, many statutes have emergency provisions that may
significantly increase the government’s chances of prevailing when
27
economic conditions provide a predicate for their invocation.
Professors Brennan, Epstein, and Staudt thus fall into a similar trap
to the attitudinalists, who postulate an equally sharp dichotomy
28
between “legal” and “political” bases of decision. Just as the law
often incorporates political values such as federalism or concern for
29
human dignity, it similarly sometimes incorporates economic
considerations into conventional legal analysis. Any effort to test the
relative power of “legal” and “economic” or “political” explanations
must grapple with the substantial overlap between these categories of
30
explanation in practice.
We have no interest in denying that pure legal principles leave
some room for judicial discretion, or that preferences about politics
and policy sometimes fill that space. We have yet to be convinced,
however, by Professors Brennan, Epstein, and Staudt’s stronger claim
that Justices intentionally vote to promote preferred economic
conditions. Our interlocutors have provided little evidence to support
that thesis. For example, in her seminal work with Jack Knight, The
31
Choices Justices Make, Professor Epstein supports the claim that
Justices behave strategically with internal Court memoranda
documenting bargaining and other strategic behavior affecting the
32
content of judicial opinions. Her article with Professors Brennan and
26. Id. at 441–42.
27. E.g., International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–06 (2006).
28. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 7, at 48–85, 86–97 (describing the authors’ version of the
legal and attitudinal models of judicial behavior).
29. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Just Blowing Smoke? Politics, Doctrine, and the Federalist
Revival After Gonzales v. Raich, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 14–15, 18–20.
30. To show, as Professors Brennan, Epstein, and Staudt seem to claim, that economic
factors are an extralegal influence on judicial decisionmaking, they would need to eliminate
from their dataset those cases in which economic conditions were legally relevant. See Brennan,
Epstein & Staudt, supra note 2, at 1206 (reasoning that “macroeconomic trends are completely
irrelevant to the decisionmaking process” in the legal model).
31. LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998).
32. E.g., id. at 32 tbl.2-2 (showing the nature and number of suggestions Justices raised in
circulated bargaining memoranda in a random sample of 1983 term cases); id. at 74 tbl.3-2
(indicating the number of cases in which Justices circulated memoranda containing explicit
bargaining statements during the 1983 Term); id. at 91 tbl.3-5 (showing the number of Chief
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Staudt, however, provides no similar documents showing that Justices
weigh economic concerns when deciding cases.
Nor do other participants in the legal system act as though the
Justices consider economic outcomes. If the state of the economy
really influences Justices—and particularly if the Justices actively seek
an economic policymaking role—one would expect participants in the
legal system to talk about it. One would expect to see
macroecononomic arguments—by which we mean arguments about
the general state of the economy, not consequentialist claims about
33
the effect of ruling a particular way on a particular issue —featured
prominently in briefs to the Court. Likewise, one would expect a
great deal more focus on economic views and acumen during the
vetting and confirmation processes for new Justices. It remains
possible that the Justices consciously vote to affect economic policy
but successfully conceal that fact from their clerks, legal professionals,
and the public. But we await direct evidence of this phenomenon.
This disagreement is more than an issue of semantics. Like
attitudinalists, Professors Brennan, Epstein, and Staudt are
contending that judges make decisions based on policy preferences
(according to their model, economic policy preferences) rather than
34
the law. But without any evidence that Justices or lawyers
acknowledge that Justices are trying to affect the economy, this
Justice Burger’s attempts to manipulate the agenda in conference discussions during the 1983
Term).
33. The latter sort of argument is extremely common. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.
Ct. 2229, 2294 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court’s decision, allowing habeas
corpus challenges to detention of enemy combatants detained abroad, “will almost certainly
cause more Americans to be killed”); Brief for Petitioner at 41–51, Wyeth v. Levine, No. 061249 (U.S. May 28, 2008), available at http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs/0708/06-1249_Petitioner.pdf (arguing that allowing state tort suits against drug manufacturers even
after the Food and Drug Administration has approved the drug’s warning label would
discourage people from using drugs in beneficial ways). But if the claim Professors Brennan,
Epstein, and Staudt advance is simply that the Justices sometimes (or even often) respond to
consequentialist arguments about the effects of ruling in a particular way, then their article is
hardly breaking new ground. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING
OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 11–12 (2005) (advocating “a broader interpretive approach
that places considerable importance upon consequences”).
34. See Brennan, Epstein & Staudt, supra note 2, at 1207 (rejecting the legal model of
judicial decisionmaking and concluding that “Justices, in short, will seek to use their
decisionmaking power to promote adept policymaking inside the executive and legislative
branches of government”). Admittedly, Professors Brennan, Epstein, and Staudt also distance
themselves from the attitudinal theory. Id. But because they claim that economic policy
preferences outside the law shape judicial decisions, objections that attitudinalists overestimate
how often judges deliberately make decisions for nonlegal reasons apply to Brennan, Epstein,
and Staudt’s model as well.
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assertion implies that the Supreme Court’s decisions may be
35
subterfuge. If Brennan, Epstein, and Staudt are correct, the Court
36
has seriously breached public trust. No wonder, then, that many of
the participants in this Symposium have asked empiricists to tread
carefully before making these kinds of claims. As Judge Michael
Boudin points out,
[T]o call judges’ subsequent choices in public policy cases “political”
is mere provocation. One can reply blandly that these decisions are
political in the sense that they relate to public policy, but few lay
readers (or judges) will take it that way. Policy often matters in
deciding cases, but it is usually policy attributable to Congress or to
public policy reflected in case law, common sense, and the values of
the community. Where exactly should judges look when existing law
37
stops short?

Given the law’s long history recognizing that many factors, including
38
environment, can shape judges’ decisionmaking, perhaps a less
forceful claim might offer more mutual ground for legal scholars and
empiricists going forward.
II. THE COURT VERSUS THE NEW DEAL
Professors Brennan, Epstein, and Staudt’s second conclusion is
that their data debunk conventional wisdom that, prior to the 1937
39
“switch in time,” the Court was unrelentingly hostile to the
40
Roosevelt administration. We are skeptical, however, about how
much light the data they offer shed on this matter. The constitutional

35. We detect a similar suggestion in Professor Knight’s strong distinction between the
articulated rationale for a judicial decision and the “actual” bases of decision. See Knight, supra
note 8, at 1452 (“[T]he judge’s opinion may be unrelated to the actual factors that were
influential in deciding the case.”). Although we cannot develop the point here, we believe that
opinions reflect judges’ actual reasons in a considerable majority of cases.
36. See Kahan, supra note 19, at 9 (arguing that his cultural cognition explanation is more
palatable than the attitudinal model because it “spare[s] us from the disappointment associated
with believing that judicial disagreement stems from self-conscious, and self-consciously
concealed, political disregard for the law”).
37. Boudin, supra note 10, at 1688. Judge Boudin acknowledges that the judiciary should
remain open to learning about its operations, but he suggests that empirical scholars also could
show “a little more care in how their conclusions are packaged and explained.” Id. at 1689.
38. See supra notes 17–21 and accompanying text.
39. See generally WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 213–36 (1995) (describing the
Court’s change of direction in 1937).
40. Brennan, Epstein & Staudt, supra note 2, at 1196.
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conflict over the regulatory state, which culminated in the 1930s clash
between the Court and the New Deal, was fought out primarily in
three doctrinal areas: substantive due process or “freedom of
41
contract” challenges to both state and federal regulatory laws,
federalism-based challenges to national legislation under the
42
Commerce Clause, and a much more limited class of nondelegation
43
challenges to early federal administrative agencies. It is well known
that, in other areas, the Supreme Court was often friendly to
governmental initiatives. In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
44
Corp., for example, the Supreme Court construed presidential
power to act in foreign affairs extremely broadly, brushing aside a
nondelegation challenge. The Court sharply distinguished between
the national government’s domestic and foreign affairs powers,
emphasizing that “there are differences between them, and . . . these
45
differences are fundamental.” The doctrinal type of case thus
matters a great deal when assessing the role of the Court vis-à-vis the
political branches. Without some effort to demonstrate that tax cases
are typical for the period, it is hard to see how Brennan, Epstein, and
Staudt can draw general conclusions from their tax-based dataset.
In any event, we doubt that the “unrelenting hostility” thesis
Professors Brennan, Epstein, and Staudt attack is, in fact, the
41. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 560–61 (1923) (striking down a
minimum wage law as a violation of the “constitutional liberty of contract”); Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45, 60–61 (1905) (“The act is not, within any fair meaning of the term, a health
law, but is an illegal interference with the rights of individuals, both employers and employés, to
make contracts . . . .”).
42. See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 548 (1935)
(invalidating part of the National Industrial Recovery Act because it violated the boundary
between “direct and indirect effects of intrastate transactions upon interstate commerce,” a
“fundamental” distinction “essential to the maintenance of our constitutional system”);
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 275–76 (1918) (striking down a federal child labor law
because it violated the Commerce Clause).
43. See, e.g., Schecter, 295 U.S. at 537–38 (“Congress cannot delegate legislative power to
the President to exercise an unfettered discretion to make whatever laws he thinks may be
needed or advisable for the rehabilitation and expansion of trade or industry.”); Panama Ref.
Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935) (rejecting another provision of the National Industrial
Recovery Act because “Congress manifestly is not permitted to abdicate, or to transfer to
others, the essential legislative functions with which it is thus vested”).
44. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
45. Id. at 315; see also Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens,
Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX.
L. REV. 1, 5 (2002) (arguing that Justice Sutherland’s opinion in Curtiss-Wright adopted a vision
of federal power in which “the Constitution . . . stopped at the water’s edge, and the powers of
the United States in the external realm derived not from the Constitution, but from concepts of
sovereignty shared, recognized, and defined by the community of nations”).
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46

conventional wisdom in constitutional law. (Certainly it is not what
47
one of us teaches his first-year students in the subject. ) Even in the
key areas of doctrinal conflict, the Court’s record was mixed. One
leading casebook notes, for example, that “[a]lthough the Court
employed substantive due process on many occasions, it sustained at
least as many regulations as it struck down,” and that the Court’s
Lochner-era invalidations “centered primarily, although not
exclusively, on labor legislation, the regulation of prices, and
48
restrictions on entry into business.” Likewise, in the Commerce
Clause cases, the Court combined restrictive decisions like Hammer v.
49
50
Dagenhart with broader constructions of federal power. As
Professor Barry Cushman has demonstrated, the Court’s switch in
time represented a choice, in each area, of one already-prominent
doctrinal strand over a rival strand, not a categorical change of
51
previously consistent direction.
We are unsure what the statistical analysis of tax cases Professors
Brennan, Epstein, and Staudt offer can add to this picture. In addition
to the problems we have already noted, simply counting cases cannot
assess the qualitative significance of particular decisions. Although
Brennan, Epstein, and Staudt find the Court ruled against the
government more frequently in these cases prior to 1930, a more
doctrinally oriented scholar has observed that, prior to 1934, “[i]n the
tax cases and in the commerce cases . . . the Supreme Court had
conducted only occasional and rather limited forays against the
46. Professors Brennan, Epstein, and Staudt cite a number of standard texts indicating that
the Supreme Court posed a significant obstacle to the New Deal program. See Brennan, Epstein
& Staudt, supra note 2, at 1223–24 n.74. But none of these sources says that the Court’s
decisions attacking the New Deal were numerous as a percentage of the Court’s overall work
product during the period or that its opposition extended to decisions outside a relatively small
number of doctrinal categories. The conventional wisdom would have to be categorical indeed
to be disproven by an observation that the government won a majority of its tax cases during the
relevant period.
47. See Ernest A. Young, The Supreme Court and Constitutional Structure (Oct. 2008)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal).
48. GEOFFREY R. STONE, LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, CASS R. SUNSTEIN, MARK V.
TUSHNET & PAMELA S. KARLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 755–56 (5th ed. 2005).
49. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
50. See, e.g., Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 360 (1914)
(upholding the Interstate Commerce Commission’s authority to regulate intrastate commerce
that substantially affects interstate commerce); see also Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine
Workers, 268 U.S. 295, 310 (1925) (construing the reach of the Antitrust Act broadly); Stafford
v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 528 (1922) (upholding the constitutionality of the Packers and
Stockyards Act of 1921 under the Commerce Clause).
51. See BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT 45–225 (1998).
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welfare state. . . . [T]he actual negative decisions of importance were
few, and the march toward regulation had been at most deflected
52
slightly and, here and there, somewhat delayed.”
The Court’s confrontation with the New Deal intensified in
1935–1936, however, and this confrontation did extend into the tax
53
realm. In United States v. Butler, the Court struck down a key New
Deal law, the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA), holding that the
act was beyond Congress’s taxing-and-spending power because it
54
invaded the reserved powers of the states in the Tenth Amendment.
The Court acknowledged that it was invalidating a critical part of the
New Deal. Rejecting the government’s argument that the national
government had power to tax individual farmers who refused to
participate in the AAA’s program because of the scope of the
economic crisis, the Court explained,
It does not help to declare that local conditions throughout the
nation have created a situation of national concern; for this is but to
say that whenever there is a widespread similarity of local
conditions, Congress may ignore constitutional limitations upon its
55
own powers and usurp those reserved to the states.

Rather than deliberately deferring to Congress and President
Roosevelt in 1936, the Court chose—at a critical moment—to
undermine the New Deal. Regardless of how the Court performed in
individual cases, it seems unlikely that the Justices were deliberately
56
trying to help the political branches in a crisis just when they were
invalidating key legislation.
In its practical significance, a setback like Butler may outweigh
57
five or ten government victories in ordinary tax cases. Professors
Brennan, Epstein, and Staudt offer no metric, however, for assessing
the relative significance of individual judicial results. Even within the
tax area, their approach thus overlooks important nuances in cases
during the period that may challenge their overarching conclusion
52. ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 100–01 (5th ed. 2005).
53. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
54. Id. at 74.
55. Id. at 74–75.
56. See Brennan, Epstein & Staudt, supra note 2, at 1198 (“[W]hen the Justices believe that
the economic crisis is the result of factors largely beyond the control of the government, they
will often not sanction federal policymakers but instead seek to work as a team with the other
branches of government to remedy the national crisis . . . .”).
57. See LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 39, at 96 (describing the AAA, struck down in Butler,
as one of “Roosevelt’s two most important recovery programs”).
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that the Justices were voting to shape economic policy by assisting the
government’s program.
More broadly, Professors Brennan, Epstein, and Staudt’s
contention that the Court deferred to the political branches during
the Great Depression fails to explain the Court’s famed and frequent
rejection of important pieces of New Deal legislation outside the tax
area. After all, Brennan, Epstein, and Staudt purport to have chosen
tax cases largely for reasons of convenience, not because they think
the Court is uniquely likely to vote to influence economic policy in
58
tax cases but not in other areas. If their thesis holds, then historical
evidence should show the Court trying to aid the government by
implementing the political branches’ chosen remedies for the
Depression across a variety of doctrinal areas, including freedom of
contract and the Commerce Clause. But that is hardly what the
Court’s resistance to the New Deal, which stiffened mid-decade,
suggests. In cases like A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
59
60
States, Carter v. Carter Coal Co., and Morehead v. New York ex rel.
61
Tipaldo, the Court struck down or threatened major New Deal
initiatives precisely at the time when the Brennan-Epstein-Staudt
model predicts that the Court should have supported government
62
policy. Regardless of how many other cases the government won in
this period, it seems unlikely the Court thought that these
government victories would overcome the Court’s hostile decisions in
terms of qualitative importance. The Court’s conservative majority
surely intended decisions like Schechter and Carter Coal to threaten
the New Deal, and it must have expected the Roosevelt
administration to perceive them as threats. Does anyone really think
that Franklin Roosevelt simply misperceived the Court’s behavior

58. See Brennan, Epstein & Staudt, supra note 2, at 1209 (“We could use several legal
contexts to test our theory, but we believe that taxation is an excellent venue for investigating
the effects of the economy on judicial behavior . . . .”).
59. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
60. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
61. Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936). Although Tipaldo
invalidated state minimum-wage legislation, it revived the doctrine of Adkins v. Children’s
Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923), which had invalidated a federal minimum wage law, and it was
widely perceived as indicating that the Court would employ economic substantive due process
to attack national New Deal legislation. See DAVID M. KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM FEAR: THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE IN DEPRESSION AND WAR, 1929–1945, at 329–30 (1999).
62. See, e.g., LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 39, at 215 (“The Supreme Court during these
months [in 1935 and 1936] frequently went out of its way to frustrate the Roosevelt
administration.”).
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when he proposed court packing as a remedy to curb the Court’s
hostility?
The basic problem is that quantitative analysis that simply counts
case results cannot, of itself, refute the established qualitative story
concerning the Court and the New Deal. On one hand, Professors
Brennan, Epstein, and Staudt have shown that the government won a
good many (tax) cases during this period. On the other, however,
nothing in the data can deny that the Court became increasingly
hostile to the New Deal in high-profile constitutional cases and that
these cases amounted to major setbacks for President Roosevelt’s
program. A macroeconomic model that could predict in advance, or
at least explain in hindsight, the overall qualitative drift under certain
conditions would be both interesting and useful. But our
interlocutors’ model does not do that. And absent some method of
weighing qualitative importance of cases won and lost, one cannot
even confirm the hypothesis that the Court favors the government
overall during an economic depression.
We think, moreover, that conventional legal explanations may
well resolve apparent contradictions in the Court’s results. The major
government setbacks we have discussed—for example, Butler,
Schechter, Carter Coal—were all cases about the constitutional
boundaries of government power. We suspect that most of the cases
in the Brennan-Epstein-Staudt dataset, however, involve the
application of the tax laws to cases that all concede come within the
constitutional purview of governmental authority. These cases may
involve difficult questions of statutory construction or the application
of law to fact, but not outright challenges to the legitimacy of
government power. Perhaps the Court saw the case for deference to
governmental actors as more compelling when government officials
were acting within their constitutional authority but wished to
maintain a more vigilant posture when policing the boundaries of that
constitutional authority. This stance would be consistent, for example,
with the “constitutional fact” doctrine announced in the Court’s
63
earliest encounter with administrative adjudication. It would also be
consistent with later tendencies to defer to agency actions pursuant to
64
statutory authority but to review constitutional claims de novo. One

63. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51–61 (1932).
64. See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV.
1095, 1115 (2009) (“[E]ven in cases where agency action is otherwise committed to agency
discretion by law as to statutory claims, the Court has allowed review of constitutional claims,
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would have to investigate the tax cases in the dataset to verify this
hypothesis. But the Brennan-Epstein-Staudt hypothesis standing
alone cannot account for the pattern of major government losses in
high-profile constitutional cases like Butler or Schechter,
notwithstanding the Court’s overall tendency to rule in favor of the
government. Our conventional legal explanation may well account for
this tendency.
In sum, legal analysis remains useful to understanding the
nuances of Court behavior. Legal scholars first demonstrated that the
Court was neither uniformly hostile nor uniformly positive toward the
Roosevelt administration even prior to the 1937 switch in time.
Indeed, legal scholarship provides a more nuanced view of the
Court’s decisions during the New Deal than Professors Brennan,
Epstein, and Staudt have acknowledged, and their failure to
recognize other scholars’ findings may explain some of the legal
academy’s skepticism toward the empirical project. Additionally, law
may actually explain why the Court tended to favor the government
during the 1930s yet voted against the New Deal in important cases.
Unless empiricists are open to considering legal explanations for
empirical findings, they may overlook new areas of research.
III. EXPLAINING AND PREDICTING
Finally, Professors Brennan, Epstein, and Staudt claim that their
findings “help explain Supreme Court votes” and “forecast upcoming
65
votes in the context of the nation’s serious economic decline.” To
explain and forecast the Court’s decisions, however, Brennan,
Epstein, and Staudt would need to offer a more fine-grained account
of why they are observing this trend in tax cases and how
macroeconomic factors influence judicial decisionmaking. Without
considerably more information concerning how the Court responds to
macroeconomic stimuli, it is difficult either to explain or predict its
behavior.
The first problem concerns the divide between the two quite
different types of responses to macroeconomic factors that Professors
Brennan, Epstein, and Staudt hypothesize. In “ordinary” times, they
suggest, the Court rewards the government for good economic

professedly in order to avoid the serious constitutional questions that would arise if judicial
review of constitutional claims were unavailable.”).
65. Brennan, Epstein & Staudt, supra note 2, at 1196.

YOUNG BLONDEL IN FINAL FINAL.DOC

5/5/2009 4:28:08 PM

1774

[Vol. 58:1759

DUKE LAW JOURNAL
66

performance and punishes it during downturns. In times of serious
economic crisis, on the other hand, the Court bands together with the
67
political branches to help get the economy back on its feet. But this
dualist approach to economic stimuli presumes that the Justices—few
of whom are economic experts—can accurately differentiate between
ordinary downturns and serious crises. Even economic experts cannot
tell, for example, when the nation entered a recession in 2008, how
68
serious the recession is, and when it will end. Should the Justices
begin to punish the government or defer to it? In the absence of
readily applicable criteria to determine which of the two opposing
courses to follow, the import of macroeconomic factors for judicial
decisionmaking is simply indeterminate.
We also think that Professors Brennan, Epstein, and Staudt need
to defend their assumption that Justices respond to economic stimuli
in the same way that voters do. A voter choosing a candidate is in a
very different position than a Justice considering whether to
invalidate a government policy. When voters decide whether to
continue supporting the incumbent, their alternative is to put
someone else in office who may have a better idea. The Court cannot
do the latter; it generally must vote up or down on a government
policy, having only extremely limited opportunities to replace that
policy with some preferred alternative. It is therefore unclear why the
Justices would think that merely punishing incumbent leaders—
without replacing them with someone else—would help the economy.
Throwing a wrench into the only available policy may be even worse.
Without further analysis, the simple hypothesis that Justices act like
voters is unpersuasive.
This second objection drives at a larger problem with importing
political science scholarship into legal academia—the risk that
nonlegal experts may import preconceived expectations as well.
Professors Brennan, Epstein, and Staudt begin by hypothesizing that
66. Id. at 1198.
67. Id.
68. See Edmund L. Andrews, Recession Began Last December, Economists Say, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 2, 2008, at A1; Neil Irwin, Recession Could End This Year, Fed Chief Says, WASH.
POST, Feb. 25, 2009, at A1. The same has been true of past economic crises, including the Great
Depression. See, e.g., KENNEDY, supra note 61, at 65 (“Down to the last weeks of 1930,
Americans could still plausibly assume that they were caught up in yet another of the routine
business-cycle downswings that periodically afflicted their traditionally boom-and-bust
economy.”); id. at 59 (noting that “most Americans in 1930 saw these developments less clearly
than did later analysts” and that the drop in GNP and rise in unemployment had actually been
greater during the 1921 recession than in the initial stages of the Great Depression).
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Justices act like voters. They appear to have developed their core
thesis—that the Justices vote to punish or reward the political
branches depending on economic conditions—from a behavior model
70
designed specifically for voters. But voters have a fundamentally
different responsibility than Justices. At a minimum, our interlocutors
have not explained or defended the assumption that voters and
Justices behave similarly.
A statistical correlation between economic performance and case
results cannot justify their assumption. As Professor Frank Cross has
noted, readers should avoid reading too much into statistical
correlations—showing a correlation does not prove variables are
71
necessarily related. Moreover, analysis of Professors Brennan,
Epstein, and Staudt’s general data cannot exclude certain important
alternative possibilities. We have already noted that economic factors
are legally relevant in important classes of cases. Another possibility
arises from the voter model itself: if political support for the
government tends to track economic performance, then how do we
know that economic performance has any direct effect on the courts?
After all, judges might simply be responding to the government’s
political support, which in turn responds to the economy. Absent
some way to control for the government’s level of political support,
Brennan, Epstein, and Staudt may simply have confirmed Mr.
Dooley’s original assertion that the Supreme Court follows the
72
election returns.
Perhaps one could respond that the Brennan-Epstein-Staudt
model is only preliminary. But this literature has a penchant for
throwing out “preliminary” explanations that, without much
refinement, soon become conventional wisdom in political science
73
circles. This tendency is particularly troubling when political science
scholars purport to “discover” the actual reasons judges decide cases,
which judges then successfully conceal by filling opinions with legal
69. Brennan, Epstein & Staudt, supra note 2, at 1194.
70. See id. at 1195.
71. FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 4 (2007); see
also Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies that Attempt to
Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2009)
(manuscript at 13–14) (cautioning against adopting empirical conclusions uncritically).
72. See supra text accompanying note 1.
73. See Frank B. Cross, The Justices of Strategy, 48 DUKE L.J. 511, 538 (1998) (book
review) (calling Professors Epstein and Knight’s judicial behavioral model in The Choices
Justice Make “one-dimensional” but conceding that “they are presenting an initial model”). Ten
years have passed without a great deal of refinement in key aspects of this strategic model.
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justifications. These often-undersupported claims can enter the
75
public consciousness uncritically, undermining courts’ legitimacy.
These claims also risk misleading participants in the legal system,
many of whom lack the statistical proficiency to properly evaluate
76
empirical findings. Because lawyers and the general public may
misunderstand the limits of “preliminary” findings, perhaps
empiricists should avoid reaching for bold explanations of early data.
Legal scholars have long contended that other explanations soften or
explain empiricists’ claims that judges vote by ideology or policy
77
preference. The most fruitful avenues for empirical research, we
suspect, will involve more circumscribed research questions at the
intersection of political science and legal explanations.
A third problem is that the Brennan-Epstein-Staudt account is
simultaneously too general and too narrow. It is too general in the
sense that, without a more fine-grained understanding of why
economic factors influence Justices in some cases but not others, the
model cannot predict (or explain) results in particular disputes. Butler
and similar cases demonstrate that, even in times when the overall
data show the Court favoring the government, the government can
still lose—and lose big—in individual cases. So if one wants to explain
or predict individual cases, then one needs to better determine when
Justices defer to government policy based on something more specific
than the Justices’ general self-interest in overall economic
performance. We are not sure that our interlocutors can offer that,
and we have already suggested that traditional types of legal
explanations may better explain individual decisions.
Our interlocutors’ account is too narrow, however, in that its
empirical demonstration focuses only on tax cases. Although
74. See, e.g., SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 7, at 53 (“[W]e argue that the legal model and
its components serve only to rationalize the Court’s decisions and to cloak the reality of the
Court’s decision-making process.”); Knight, supra note 8, at 1542 (“[T]he judge’s opinion may
be unrelated to the actual factors that were influential in deciding the case.”).
75. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, At the Court, Dissent over States’ Rights Is Now War, N.Y.
TIMES, June 9, 2002, at C3 (suggesting that the attitudinal model explains Justices’ decisions in
federalism cases without considering arguments against the validity of the model).
76. See Edwards & Livermore, supra note 71 (manuscript at 14) (“[M]ost law students and
members of the legal profession are not trained in the nuances and limits of empirical
analysis.”).
77. E.g., Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of
Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 251, 279–309 (1997) (critiquing the
attitudinal model and concluding that it “clearly contains some truth” but “offers only an
incomplete explanation of legal decisionmaking” and “[t]he exaggerated claims of some
proponents are insupportable in the face of closer scrutiny”).
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empiricists may struggle to document it statistically, it is hard to rule
out the possibility that judicial deference to government actors varies
profoundly across subject areas. For instance, conventional wisdom
holds that the contemporary judiciary defers more to some executive
agencies than to others, based on differential evaluations of the
competence and integrity of those agencies; more formally, existing
doctrine prescribes varying levels of deference depending on, for
example, whether an agency has been delegated legislative
78
rulemaking authority. If so, this fact would seriously undermine how
well scholars can generalize from findings based on tax cases. To
predict the consequences of the current economic crisis on judicial
decisionmaking, then, we would need not only some overall measure
of deference but some way to understand how that plays out in
individual regulatory areas.
It is possible that more fine-grained empirical studies of cases—
79
as Professor Knight has proposed —could resolve these questions.
Legal scholars can assist that effort by identifying gaps in doctrinal
explanations that more quantitative approaches might fill. From the
other direction, empirical scholars like Professors Brennan, Epstein,
and Staudt might identify gaps in the explanatory power of their data
that could, in turn, benefit from legal analysis. Along these lines, we
conclude by offering some law-generated suggestions for refining the
empirical investigation of macroeconomic influences on judicial
decisionmaking.
IV. QUESTIONS ABOUT THE RESEARCH DESIGN
In this last Part, we suggest some ways to build on and modify
Professors Brennan, Epstein, and Staudt’s project. These suggestions
are internal in the sense that they accept the basic thrust of the
project but offer some ways the study could be refined.
We have already suggested that tax cases may not be all that
representative of the dynamic between the Court and the political

78. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 233–38 (2001). See generally
William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court
Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083
(2008) (describing the Court’s different approaches to deferring to administrative agency
actions).
79. See Knight, supra note 8, at 1548 (calling on empirical scholars to study the substantive
content of law).
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branches. A related difficulty concerns the relevance of particular
tax cases to the Brennan-Epstein-Staudt thesis. That thesis could have
two distinct versions: In one version, the Justices rule on cases to
judge and attempt to influence the current administration’s economic
policy. In the other, the Court generally judges the state of the
economy and then punishes the political branches for bad economic
management by reflexively voting against the government in cases
across the board. If Professors Brennan, Epstein, and Staudt are
advancing the latter argument, then it makes sense to count all tax
cases in the dataset. But if their position is, in fact, closer to the first
alternative, then we would think one should count only those tax
cases that actually reflect the current administration’s economic
81
policy. A more focused study would exclude, for example, many tax
cases interpreting older provisions enacted under previous
administrations. In any event, Brennan, Epstein, and Staudt ought to
explain more explicitly which tax cases are relevant to their thesis and
why—preferably by clarifying the relationship between particular
cases and the policy of the incumbent administration.
A second issue concerns the impact of time-lag problems on
interpretations of judicial results. Our friends from The University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill have addressed this issue at greater
82
length in their response in this Symposium, so we only note the
problem briefly. Two potentially relevant lags exist: the time that
elapses from enactment of a statute or implementation of a policy to
any legal challenge to that statute or policy and the lag from the
83
initial challenge to the Supreme Court’s decision of the case.

80. We are also nervous about inferring much from tax cases decided immediately after
Congress enacted the first constitutional federal income tax in 1913. Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, §
II, 38 Stat. 114, 166–81. One would expect Court decisions to fluctuate for some time while the
Court sorted out the meaning of the new statute.
81. It is not clear that the Roosevelt administration focused much on tax reform other than
the tax provisions connected to the Social Security Act that the Court struck down in Butler. We
are indebted to our colleagues Larry Zelenak and Richard Schmalbeck on this point.
82. See Scott Baker, Adam Feibelman & William P. Marshall, Response, Justices as
Economic Fixers: A Response to A Macrotheory of the Court, 58 DUKE L.J. 1627, 1637–38
(2009). Professor Young thinks that “friends” is a particularly generous appellation given that
this issue is going to press in the midst of the NCAA basketball tournament. Ms. Blondel
agrees, but only because Carolina beat Notre Dame in football in 2008.
83. See, e.g., United States v. Cambridge Loan & Bldg. Co., 278 U.S. 55, 55–60 (1928)
(reporting that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed taxes against the bank on
September 18, 1924, when Professors Brennan, Epstein, and Staudt show the economy was
beginning an upswing, but that the Court decided the case in November 1928, after the economy
had peaked, bottomed, and begun to improve); Supplee-Biddle Hardware Co. v. United States,
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Professors Brennan, Epstein, and Staudt do not appear to address
which time is relevant for pegging a litigated dispute to the
government’s larger economic policy and its macroeconomic result.
Does the Court evaluate the competence of the government that
enacted a statute by considering the economic climate at the time it
was enacted? Or does the Court simply kick a government that it
perceives to be incompetent (because of economic performance) at
the time of decision, regardless of whether it was the same
government or same conditions when the statute was originally
enacted? This confusion is particularly a problem during the early
period of the Brennan-Epstein-Staudt study because the economy
was fluctuating in relatively short-term cycles and the lifecycle of
84
some cases likely spanned upturns and downturns.
Our third question arises from the assertion that the Justices
85
consciously seek to influence macroeconomic policy. Professors
Brennan, Epstein, and Staudt do not appear to suggest that Supreme
Court decisions themselves affect national economic performance.
But why not? It seems at least possible that the Justices could
realistically expect to influence economic performance directly in at
least some cases. It would be interesting to know, for example, what
the New York Stock Exchange did on “Black Monday,” May 27,
86
1935, when Schechter, Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford
87
(which struck down a mortgage moratorium), and Humphrey’s
88
89
Executor v. United States all came down on the same day. If our
58 Ct. Cl. 343, 346 (1923) (reporting that the government assessed taxes in July 1922, during an
expansion, but the Court decided the case in May 1924, after the economy had peaked and
begun to sink), aff’d, 265 U.S. 189 (1924).
84. We also note that tax cases may be unrepresentative because, in the early period of
Professors Brennan, Epstein, and Staudt’s study, tax cases came to the Court quicker than other
sorts of cases because of expedited review provisions. In the modern era, the Court’s
discretionary certiorari policy would also complicate this problem because it encourages the
Court not to take the first case from a court of appeals raising a given issue, but rather to wait
until a circuit split develops.
85. For a discussion of this assertion, see supra notes 14–16 and accompanying text.
86. Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
87. Id. at 601–02.
88. Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). Although Humphrey’s
Executor upheld the federal law in question—which allowed Congress to limit the president’s
authority to remove a commissioner of an independent agency—against constitutional
challenge, id. at 631–32, the Court’s decision was widely perceived as a challenge to the
Roosevelt administration, which had sought broader control of the national administrative
bureaucracy, see LEUCHTENBERG, supra note 39, at 78 (reporting that Humphrey’s Executor
“stunned the Roosevelt Administration”); see also Christopher S. Yoo, Steven G. Calabresi &
Laurence D. Nee, The Unitary Executive During the Third Half-Century, 1889–1945, 80 NOTRE
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interlocutors are right about Justices’ incentives to influence
economic performance, one might expect the Justices to attempt to
do so directly as well as indirectly. If we see no such attempts, on the
other hand, we might question the salience of economic motivations
in judicial decisionmaking.
Finally, we note some important structural considerations arising
from the complex institutional environment that the U.S. Supreme
Court inhabits. Initially, the Supreme Court is not the only court in
the system. Do lower court judges respond to macroeconomic factors
in the same way as the Supreme Court? This point is important, in
part, because the behavior of the lower courts affect the ways in
90
which issues get on the Supreme Court’s agenda. More importantly,
cases in the Supreme Court are highly unrepresentative of the run of
litigation. If Professors Brennan, Epstein, and Staudt want to infer
anything about judicial behavior generally, they must broaden their
91
focus to include a more typical dataset of judicial results.
Moreover, the federal government is not the only government.
The Supreme Court has a relationship with two sets of economic
policymakers—the national government and the states. One might
even expect the Court to have been more concerned with state cases,
especially in the early period of the study, given that state legislatures
were primary regulators at that point in history. State governments
also affect the economy, and many, many state tax cases exist—
including constitutional challenges to those taxes under the dormant
Commerce Clause and other doctrines. The Supreme Court decided a
number of these cases during the period relevant to the Brennan92
Epstein-Staudt study, and it would surely be relevant to know
whether the results in those cases conform to the “macrotheory”

DAME L. REV. 1, 84–88 (2004) (reciting the history of Humphrey’s Executor and concluding that
it “represents another example of the hostility towards the Roosevelt Administration exhibited
by many Supreme Court decisions of that period”).
89. See KENNEDY, supra note 61, at 328.
90. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (explaining that the Court
granted certiorari in Lopez because the Fifth Circuit had taken the initiative to invalidate a
federal statute on Commerce Clause grounds).
91. See Edwards & Livermore, supra note 71 (manuscript at 29) (critiquing one empirical
dataset because it excludes unpublished decisions, many of which are unanimous opinions
involving settled legal issues); David F. Levi, Autocrat of the Armchair, 58 DUKE L.J. 1791,
1800–02 (2009) (book review) (critiquing Judge Posner’s book, How Judges Think, because
Posner fails to consider how judges act in typical cases).
92. E.g., McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 330–31 (1944) (dormant Commerce
Clause); Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 37 (1927) (same).
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tested on the federal side. We do not seek to answer, or even
explore, these questions in this Response. But we think that the
fascinating model that Professors Brennan, Epstein, and Staudt have
advanced would benefit from considering the complex institutional
environment in which the Court operates.
CONCLUSION
This Symposium challenges empirical scholars, legal academics,
and judges to discuss why empirical literature on judicial behavior
and more conventional legal discourse so often seem like ships
passing in the night. Professors Brennan, Epstein, and Staudt’s article
suggests both why legal experts remain skeptical and how empiricists
could provide more useful data. As several participants note, many
empiricists antagonize legal professionals by charging that judges
94
make decisions for reasons other than the law. Brennan, Epstein,
95
and Staudt similarly dismiss the legal approach. But their data do
not substantiate their most provocative claim—that the Justices
consciously seek to influence economic policy—and their model
remains largely silent on why the Justices decide particular cases the
way they do. Nor have our interlocutors adequately defended their
exclusive focus on tax cases or considered alternative explanations for
a correlation between judicial results and economic performance.
Such performance, after all, may be legally relevant or may affect the
valence and weight of more traditional political pressures on the
Court.
These difficulties in the Brennan-Epstein-Staudt study raise a
more basic problem with much of the empirical judicial behavior
literature. Few legal experts or judges are empiricists. When they
review an empirical paper, they want to know what the empiricist has
concluded from the data. Yet much empirical literature proposes
possible explanations for empirical data without carefully considering
a study’s implications. This premium placed on bold and seemingly
categorical conclusions may be a rational response to publication

93. See generally Stephen Gardbaum, New Deal Constitutionalism and the Unshackling of
the States, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 483 (1997) (discussing the Court’s approach to dormant
Commerce Clause cases concerning state taxation and regulation during the Lochner and New
Deal periods).
94. E.g., Boudin, supra note 10, at 1687 (“Figuring out why judges decide cases the way
they do is a worthy enterprise; not so scoring judicial results as ‘political.’”).
95. Brennan, Epstein & Staudt, supra note 2, at 1204.
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imperatives in academia, but to lawyers, it may suggest indifference to
legitimate explanations for empirical data. Additionally, many
empiricists, including Professors Brennan, Epstein, and Staudt, seem
to default to less plausible explanations for judicial behavior—for
example, that judges are voting their political viewpoints or trying to
affect the economy. These conclusions seem unlikely to lawyers and
inaccurate—even offensive—to judges. Because empiricists too often
fail to heed these objections, they appear entrenched, and the two
sides fail to communicate.
This breakdown is unfortunate, because we believe that
empirical approaches have great promise in enhancing our
understanding of the law and judging. Professors Brennan, Epstein,
and Staudt have observed an interesting trend in their study; in
particular, they have sharpened and provided at least some statistical
confirmation for the general intuition among legal professionals that
the more general state of the world affects the way courts decide
particular cases. The evident success of this conference suggests that
political scientists and more traditional legal scholars can work
together to refine the analysis of these and similar tendencies. Both
disciplines would benefit from that sort of nuanced and respectful
collaboration.

